Authors: Harris Niavis, Kostas Choumas, George Iosifidis, Thanasis Korakis and Leandros Tassiulas
Conference: WCNC, Instanbul, Turkey, 6 - 9 April 2014
Abstract: Experimentation in testbeds is gaining increasing ground as a necessary validation step for every theoretical study in communication networks. However, the first-come-first-served policy employed today by most testbeds does not ensure the fair and efficient utilization of their resources, which often lie idle. Ideally, every testbed should be utilized as much as possible and serve the most important requests. In this paper we introduce a novel resource scheduling mechanism for the wireless testbed NITOS. The proposed scheme is based on VCG auctions and includes an allocation and a pricing rule which induce the users to judiciously submit experiment requests. We prove theoretically and demonstrate numerically that this scheme ensures that the testbed resources (nodes and channels) are assigned to the users with the highest needs. Our mechanism can be incorporated in the next generation resource management systems for NITOS and similar testbeds.
Keywords: scheduling, auction-based, resource allocation, VCG auctions, testbed
Download paper: NITOS-incentives.pdf